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CRP = State has a Court-Recognized Privilege, generally based on the state constitution or federal First Amendent.

Indiana (SL, CRP)
Shield Law: IND. CODE Section 34-46-4-1 (West, WESTLAW through End of 2002 1st Special Sess.)

In Indiana, reporters must "receive income" from reporting and writing and be connected with or employed at "a newspaper or periodical . . . having a general circulation" or a licensed radio or television station to be covered under the statute. If a student journalist meets the requirements, he or she will be protected from disclosing in any legal or non-legal proceeding the name of any confidential source obtained from reporting. The shield law has been construed to protect only confidential sources of information rather than the information itself. College journalists seem more likely to be covered by this statue than --high school journalists because high school journalists are generally unpaid.

Student media - particularly high school media - may have more luck seeking protection under the state's court-recognized reporter's privilege. In In Re Stearns, 489 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. 1986), a state court of appeals recognized a qualified First Amendment privilege protecting disclosure of non-confidential information in a civil case. If the information desired is relevant, disclosure is critical to someone receiving a fair trial and other sources have been exhausted, the interests will be balanced to determine if compelled disclosure is warranted.

So far, Indiana courts have not distinguished between student and commercial news media. For example, in In re: Matter of an Investigation by the Prosecuting Attorney of Monroe County, Indiana, No. 53C049104CP00396 (Ind. Cir. Ct. Monroe Cty., May 21, 1991), a state circuit court judge allowed an Indiana University student photographer to argue - albeit unsuccessfully - that he was protected by the state's qualified First Amendment privilege from having to provide a county prosecutor with photographs he had taken of a campus riot. The student, who normally worked for the campus yearbook, had sold one of his photos to the Indiana Daily Student newspaper. In rejecting the student photographer's motion to quash the subpoena, the judge did not question the applicability of the privilege to student media, but rather ruled that - at least in Indiana - the First Amendment-based privilege (the student did not seek protection under the state shield law) did not apply to criminal investigations. The judge also noted that any harm to the First Amendment rights of the photographer were minimal because the student had merely witnessed and photographed the riot; he had not made any promises of confidentiality. (See story, SPLC Report, Fall 1991).

Recently, the Indiana Supreme Court in In re WTHR-TV (State v. Cline), 693 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1998), also refused to extend the First Amendment privilege to cover criminal cases.

Iowa (CRP)
Shield Law: None

Iowa does not have a shield law, but its courts recognize a qualified privilege under the First Amendment and the Iowa Constitution. The courts lean toward disclosure in criminal cases, grand jury proceedings and in libel suits. Iowa courts have held the privilege protects confidential, unpublished information as well as sources. Waterloo/Cedar Falls Courier v. Hawkeye Community College, 646 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 2002). In deciding whether to compel disclosure, the court asks whether the information is critical to the action or defense and whether all other means of obtaining it have been exhausted. A journalist requesting the privilege is protected if he or she "falls within the class of persons qualifying for the privilege" and the information sought was obtained as part of the "newsgathering process." Unfortunately, the terms "class of persons" and "newsgathering process" have not yet been defined by Iowa courts, although one district court extended the privilege to a freelance journalist. Stanfield v. Polk County, 18 Media Law Rptr. 1262 (Iowa Dist. Ct. 1990). Unless the courts say otherwise, it can be argued that student journalists are protected.

Kansas (CRP)
Shield Law: None

Kansas has no statute but recognizes a qualified privilege for both sources and information that leads to the identity of a source. The privilege is stronger in civil cases than in criminal ones. In State v. Sandstrom, 581 P.2d 812 (Kan. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979), the Kansas Supreme Court said that "a newsperson has a limited privilege of confidentiality of information and the identity of news sources" based on the First Amendment. That court approved a case-by-case balancing of the need of the defendant to a fair trial against the reporter's need for confidentiality. No appellate courts have addressed the applicability of the privilege to student journalists and it does not appear that they would be precluded from the privilege's protections simply because they are students. Indeed, in 1990 a lower court judge in Kansas ruled that a student reporter for the Wichita State University newspaper did not have to disclose the identity of a confidential source. The student journalist was subpoenaed in a lawsuit that accused members of a fraternity of trespassing and vandalism. The plaintiffs in that case believed that, during his investigation for the story, the reporter uncovered the name of the fraternity member who set fire to their jeep. The reporter did testify, but did not have to reveal the name of his source. During his testimony, the party who issued the subpoena decided not to file a motion to compel him to reveal the name. (See story, SPLC Report, Spring 1991).

Kentucky (SL)
Shield Law: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. Section 421.100 (West, WESTLAW through 2/1/03).

Kentucky's shield law provides reporters with limited protection. While the law covers any person engaged in, employed by or connected with a newspaper, radio or television station, it only protects the identity of sources and applies only when the information supplied by the source is actually published or broadcast. The law does not protect reporter's observations (e.g. witnessing a criminal act), material obtained through personal investigation or any other information. Lexington Herald-Leader v. Beard, 690 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1984); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971) (as modified), aff'd sub nom., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).

The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected the idea of a reporter's common-law privilege under both the First Amendment and the Kentucky Constitution. Lexington, 690 S.W.2d 374; Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971).

The bottom line is that Kentucky student journalists will probably be entitled to the same statutory protection available to other journalists. However, due to the law's narrow scope, caution must be exercised when making promises of confidentiality.

Louisiana (SL, CRP)
Shield Law: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Sections 45:1451­1459 (West, WESTLAW through all 2002 First Extraordinary & Regular Session Acts)

The Louisiana law covers people regularly engaged in editorial activities of the news media. It defines news media to include radio, television, press associations, etc., and any newspaper or periodical issued at regular intervals and having a paid general circulation. Unfortunately, there are no cases where the law has been applied to student journalists, so it is unclear whether student journalists would be afforded its protection. It could certainly be argued that student journalists are "regularly engaged" in editorial activities. Many student newspapers are distributed free on campus, which might seem to disqualify the paper for the lack of a paid circulation. However, it might be argued that student activity fees or tuition payments that support the paper are the equivalent of the subscription fee charged by other papers. Student journalists may also look to Louisiana v. Fontanille, 1994 La. App. LEXIS 191 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1994) to support the claim that the shield law should apply to them. In Fontanille, the court of appeals interpreted the definition of a reporter broadly to include an investigative nonfiction book author who, they held, could claim the shield law's protections.

The Louisiana Court of Appeals has held that the law protects only sources. However, it also ruled that the information produced by the source need not be published to protect the source. Dumez v. Houma Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board, 341 So.2d 1206 (La. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 344 So.2d 667 (1976). A later decision by a lower court seems to have expanded that protection by including not only the identity of the source but also any information that might reveal the source's identity. In re Michael Burns, 484 So.2d 658 (La. 1986). The law does not specify whether the source must have promised confidentiality for the law to be in effect.

There are certain limitations included in the law that must be kept in mind. First, in defamation cases, the burden is on the reporter to prove that the material was obtained from a source promised confidentiality. Second, the party seeking disclosure may apply to the court for an order to revoke the statutory privilege. The order will be granted upon a showing that the order is "essential to the public interest." In addition, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ridenhour), 520 So.2d 372 (La. 1988), an appeals court made it clear that the order will be upheld where it is shown that the subpoena was issued in good faith and not simply to harass the journalist. Finally, the Ridenhour case, in recognizing a reporter's qualified First Amendment privilege in addition to the statutory protection, held that such a privilege would not apply to criminal activity witnessed by the reporter.

Journalists should be aware that the Louisiana statute includes a fairly detailed list of procedural requirements that must be adhered to by those subpoenaing the news media. These requirements protect some of the interests of journalists and should be consulted immediately upon receipt of a subpoena.

Maine (CRP)
Shield Law: None

Student journalists in Maine have only the First Amendment to rely on for support. In In re Denis Letellier, 578 A.2d 722 (Me. 1990), the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found no qualified privilege for reporters in the Maine Constitution that was not already expressed in the First Amendment. The court adopted the Branzburg v. Hayes balancing test that was accepted by the First Circuit in Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st. Cir. 1980).

To date, there have been no reported decisions involving Maine student media. There is no reason to believe that students would not be entitled to the same protection as other journalists. Still, the lack of explicit protections suggests that Maine student journalists should be cautious in making promises of confidentiality.

Maryland (SL)
Shield Law: MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. Section 9-112 (West, WESTLAW through end of 2002 Reg. Sess.)

The Maryland shield law was the first state statute recognizing a protecting the reporter's privilege. It applies to "any person who is, or has been, employed by the news media in an news gathering or news disseminating capacity." Maryland's law completely protects confidential and non-confidential sources. However, any published or unpublished news or information can be successfully subpoenaed if the party seeking the news or information can establish by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) "the news or information is relevant to a significant legal issue," (2) it cannot be obtained by other means and (3) an overriding public interest compels disclosure. The statute's protection does not differ in civil and criminal cases. Bilney v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 406 A.2d 652 (1979). In addition, reporters do not waive the privilege by publishing the identities of their sources. Maryland journalists can only rely on the shield law for protection from compelled disclosure.

The Maryland law has not yet been applied to student journalists. However, student journalists engaged in newsgathering activities should feel confident in relying on the protections afforded by the law because its protections are written very broadly.

Massachusetts (CRP)
Shield Law: None

Student journalists may be protected from disclosing confidential and non-confidential sources and information in some circumstances. While Massachusetts has refused to adopt statutory protection for journalists or find one in their state constitution, Massachusetts courts have protected reporter's confidential sources under a First Amendment balancing test. In addition, the supreme judicial court recognized a qualified common-law privilege to protect confidential sources in a civil lawsuit. Sinnott v. Boston Retirement Board, 524 N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 528 (1988). In Sinnott, the court said that a judge may weigh the public interest in the free flow of information against the litigant's need for the information and the availability of information from other sources in deciding whether a reporter should be protected from disclosure of a source or information. The court did not indicate whether the privilege would apply to student journalists, but it did hold that the interests for and against disclosure would be balanced on a case-by-case basis.

Michigan (SL)
Shield Law: MICH. COMP. LAWS Sections 767.5a and 767A.6 (LEXIS through all 2002 legislation)

Michigan's shield laws are applicable only in grand jury proceedings and in cases where a prosecutor issues a subpoena. Both statutes protect "a reporter or other person" who gathers news for broadcast or publication. They also protect only confidential sources and unpublished information. Marketos v. American Employers Ins. Co., 460 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). Michigan courts have refused to recognize a constitution-based reporter's privilege.

In a grand jury proceeding, the shield law's privileges are overcome where the information sought concerns a "crime punishable by imprisonment for life," when it is "essential to the purpose of the proceeding" and when it cannot be obtained from another source.
Subpoenas issued by a prosecutor can only be upheld where the information has already been broadcast or published or where "the reporter is the subject of the inquiry."

No cases in Michigan have addressed how the courts would interpret the word "reporter" in the statutes. However, in In re Investigation of March 1999 Riots in East Lansing , 617 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. 2000), the state supreme court ruled that Michigan State's student newspaper and other, commercial media organizations did not have to comply with a subpoena seeking the newspaper's photos of a campus riot. The court ruled that a prosecutor, who was attempting to build a case against the rioters, could not compel the newspaper to turn over its pictures because the pictures were not disseminated to the public and the reporters were not the subject of the inquiry. (See story, SPLC Report, Winter 2000-01). Therefore, it seems clear that the shield law's broad language does cover student journalists, if not as reporters, then at least as "other persons."

Minnesota (SL) (CRP)
Shield Law: MINN. STAT. ANN. Sections 595.021-.025 (West, WESTLAW through End of 2002 1st Sp. Sess.)

The Minnesota shield law, which was revised in 1998, explicitly recognizes the public's interest in protecting the free flow of information provided by the news media. The law protects those persons "directly engaged in the gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, or publishing of information" from revealing sources or unpublished information. There are no reported cases directly involving students under the state's revised shield law, but it appears student journalists should have the same protections now afforded the commercial media.

The courts have interpreted the statute to protect even unpublished information from a non-confidential source. Arial Burials, Inc. v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., 8 Med. L. Rep. 1653 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1982). The sweeping protection offered by the law is limited by a statutory procedure for those who seek exemption from the rule. Journalists can be forced to reveal both sources and unpublished information where the material sought: (1) is clearly relevant to a gross misdemeanor or felony or a regular misdemeanor as long as the information obtained by testifying would not identify the source, (2) cannot be obtained by alternative means and (3) is necessary to prevent injustice. In addition, the shield law will not protect journalists in any defamation action where the person seeking disclosure can demonstrate that: (1) the identity of the source is clearly relevant to the issue of actual malice and (2) the information cannot be obtained by alternative means. The determination of these issues is made during a court hearing with provisions for direct appeal to a higher court. These broad exceptions leave the effectiveness of the Minnesota law in doubt. It is clear that journalists in this state must exercise caution in their offers of confidentiality.

Under the previous version of the shield law, a student newspaper was ordered to turn over photos of a raucous campus rally after a court ruled that the law, which did not shield all unpublished material, did not protect the material. The photos were sought as evidence in a trial involving a student accused of assaulting a police officer during the rally. For over two years, the student newspaper at the University of Minnesota denied the judge's request. In January 1996, however, the court found then-editor Michelle Ames in contempt of court. While Ames was prepared to go to jail rather than turn over the photos, the court instead fined the newspaper $250 for each day the photos were not turned over. The newspaper's battle finally ended with the conclusion of the trial. (See story, SPLC Report, Spring 1996).

In addition to the uncertain protections afforded them by the law, Minnesota journalists must also take heed of the holding in Cohen v. Cowels Media, 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992), where a court decided that a source can sue a reporter for breaching a pledge of confidentiality.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has declined to recognize a state-constitution-based reporter's privilege in criminal cases. State v. Turner, 550 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn. 1999). However, state courts have recognized a First Amendment-based privilege for a reporter's sources and materials in civil matters. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, 648 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. App. 2002).

Mississippi (CRP)
Shield Law: None

The state of Mississippi has recognized a reporter's qualified privilege to refuse to disclose confidential information or sources in civil and criminal proceedings. Hawkins v. Williams, Civ. No. 2900054 (Cir. Ct. 1st Jud. Dist. Hinds Cty., Mar. 16, 1983); Mississippi v. Hardin, Crim. No. 3858 (Cir. Ct. Yalobusha Cty., Mar. 23, 1983). The courts in Hawkins and Hardin based the reporter's privilege on the First Amendment and the state constitution. The privilege is not applicable, however, in defamation cases. Eason v. Federal Broadcasting Co., 697 So.2d 435, 437 (Miss. 1997). While there are no reported cases involving student journalists, there is nothing to suggest that courts would distinguish between student and commercial news media in applying the privilege.

Missouri (CRP)
Shield Law: None

The Missouri Court of Appeals has recognized a qualified privilege against compelled disclosure of confidential sources and information based on the First Amendment. State of Missouri, ex. rel. Classic III, Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1997). In Classic III, the court held that the a reporter's privilege protects "confidential communications made by confidential sources" even when the information from the sources was not relied upon for the story. The court focused on four factors when balancing the "needs of disclosure and confidentiality." The court looked to: (1) whether alternative sources of information have been exhausted, (2) the importance of protecting confidentiality, (3) whether the information is crucial to the other party's case and (4) whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie case for defamation.

While there are no reported cases involving student media, student journalists may argue that the qualified privilege applies to them on First Amendment grounds just as it would professional newsgatherers.

Montana (SL)
Shield Law: MONT. CODE ANN. Sections 26-1-901 to 26-1-903 (LEXIS through the 2002 Special Session)

Montana's student journalists are protected by one of the country's strongest shield laws. The law, known as the "Media Confidentiality Act," protects those persons "connected with or employed by" a news media organization from having to disclose any information - or the source of that information -- in any legal proceeding, provided the material was gathered in the course of the person's duties as a newsperson. In Linda Tracy v. City of Missoula, Missoula County Cause No. DV-00-849 (2001), a district court judge ruled that Linda Tracy, a University of Montana journalism student, was covered under Montana's shield law. Tracy was subpoenaed by prosecutors after she refused to turn over raw footage she shot during a Hell's Angels gathering. The footage was used for a documentary she produced for her student internship, which aired on Missoula Community Access Television. The judge said that because Tracy's work was gathered in "connection with" one of the protected media organizations listed in the state statute, she was acting as a journalist under the law and protected by the privilege. (See story, SPLC Report, Spring 2001).

Montana's law extends to both published and unpublished material. The shield law's protection can be waived, however, if the journalist volunteers to testify before a judicial, administrative or legislative body about either the information or its source. There is no reported decision in Montana where courts have recognized or declined to recognize a state or federal constitutional privilege.